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Abstract
Problem: Previous research on pay-for-performance (PFP) and pay-for-time (PFT)
employee compensation has determined employees are more productive under PFP
compensation schedules; however, research concerning employee preference and off-task
behavior between PFP and PFT schedules have yielded inconclusive results.
Procedure: Participants engaged in a check-processing task, which consisted of
entering sample checks containing a value between $1 and $999. The check-processing task
remained the same throughout all pre-experimental and experimental conditions. The check
background was white during baseline, but alternated between four colors during subsequent
phases. Each background color was associated with a monetary schedule: orange (EXT),
green (FT 15 s), blue (FR 1), and yellow (FR 5). The pre-experiment consisted of two phases:
baseline and a Stability Phase. During baseline, participants received zero monetary
compensation. During the Stability Phase, the four monetary schedules were alternated and
participants were paid according to the monetary scheduled they were working under. The
pre-experiment was used to determine the stability criteria implemented in the actual
experiment. The experiment consisted of three phases: baseline, Phase 1, and Phase 2.
Baseline and Phase 1 remained the same as during the pre-experiment, but with the inclusion
of the stability criteria. Phase 2 lasted 16 min and used the same four monetary schedules;
however, all checks began with a white-colored background. Phase 2 introduced the
observing response as a measure of reinforcement value. To engage in the observing
response, participants pressed the spacebar on the keyboard, which changed the check’s
background color from “white” to the color associated with the current schedule for 1 s.
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Findings: Results showed that the majority of the nine experimental participants
produced higher rates of check processing under PFP conditions. Similarly, results from
Phase 1 demonstrated that all participants spent more time on-task under PFP conditions;
however, Phase 2 results indicated that the majority (67%) of participants that engaged in offtask behavior were off-task the most under PFP conditions. Sixty-seven percent of the
participants that engaged in the observing response observed the most under the denser PFP
schedule (i.e., FR 1), although observing tended to be variable both within and across
participants. The study concluded with an overview of the results and a discussion on
potential limitations and areas of future PFP/PFT research.
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Introduction
Using monetary incentives to influence performance dates back to the earliest records
of human history, with the first documented record residing in the Babylon dynasty era (Peach
& Wren, 1991). Yet, the majority of incentive records and research begins in the latter part of
the nineteenth century, when growth in American large-scale enterprise during the Industrial
Revolution led to the concern that labor-intensive industries (i.e., factories, workshops) were
inefficient (Tolles, 1964). Inefficiency, coupled with growing employee distrust of incentive
programs, prompted Fredrick W. Taylor—who was the first notable incentive researcher—to
seek more objective methods for implementing incentive programs (Peach & Wren, 1991). By
the 1920s over 50% of manufacturing employees were compensated via performancecontingent pay; however, the use of incentives waned a decade later during the Great
Depression, was revived during World War II, and has ebbed and flowed within American
society since then (Mitchell, Lewin, & Lawler, 1990).
Early modern incentive research expanded upon Skinner’s (1953) schedules of wage
reinforcement analysis, which extended basic operant schedules of reinforcement (e.g., fixedratio, fixed-interval) to the economic control of behavior. The success of early modern
incentive research, which examined the use of money as a reinforcer (Schneier, 1974),
contingent and non-contingent rewards (Orphen, 1982), schedules of reinforcement (e.g.,
Yukl, Wexley, & Seymore, 1972), and even company-wide applications, such as the Lincoln
Electric Company (Handlin, 1992), aided in the development of more-refined employee
compensation studies.
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Today, two main systems of employee compensation exist: Pay-for-performance and
pay-for-time (Long, Wilder, Betz, & Dutta, 2012). Pay-for-performance (PFP) is a responsebased pay system that gives employees the opportunity to earn money based on the quality or
amount of work. PFT is a time-based pay system in which employees are paid for the duration
of time spent at work, contingent upon attendance and completion of basic responsibilities
(Long et al., 2012). PFT schedules are more common today, although surveys suggest about
35% of U.S. organizations implement some sort of employee monetary incentive outside of
PFT compensation (Gross, 1995 as cited in Long et al., 2012).
Considering the prevalence of monetary incentives in business, numerous studies have
inspected variables related to PFP and PFT systems, including feedback (e.g., Gaetani,
Johnson, & Austin, 1983; Slowiak, Dickinson, & Huitema, 2011), individually-earned
incentives in a group context (Honeywell, Dickinson, & Poling, 1997; McGee, Dickinson,
Huitema, & Culig, 2006; Stoneman & Dickinson, 1989; Thurkow, Bailey, & Stamper, 2000),
group-earned incentives in a group context (Honeywell et al., 1997; Thurkow et al., 2000),
and even employee of the month programs (Johnson & Dickinson, 2010) and lottery systems
(McNally & Abernathy, 1989). Numerous studies have concluded that PFP resulted in larger
productivity gains than PFT (e.g., Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Farr, 1976; George &
Hopkins, 1989; Long et al., 2012); however, undifferentiated results have been obtained
regarding incentive schedule preference (e.g., Dickinson & Gillette, 1993; Long et al., 2012).
Some studies have found that participants rated PFP systems as more satisfying (e.g.,
McGee et al., 2006; Orphen, 1982) and preferred (e.g., Fellows & Mawhinney, 1997; McGee
et al., 2006) compared to PFT; however, not all studies have produced strong results
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supporting preference for either condition. For instance, Farr (1976) found that participants
rated PFT systems more satisfying than PFP (Farr, 1976). Other research has yielded
comparable job satisfaction ratings across pay conditions (e.g., Pritchard, Hollenback, &
DeLeo, 1980) and has also found little relationship between performance and satisfaction
(Orphen, 1982). Under choice scenarios, several natural (e.g., Nebeker & Neuberger, 1985;
Thurkow et al., 2000) and analogue (e.g., Long et al., 2012; Sundby, Dickinson, & Michael,
1996) setting studies have found that the majority of participants voted to continue working
under PFP schedules. However, the concepts of choice, preference, and satisfaction have
largely differed across studies, making it difficult to draw direct comparisons.
The final choice phase in Long et al. (2012) involved the experimenter asking subjects
to choose between the two pay systems (PFT/PFP). In the most generic sense, choice is
defined as “the act of picking or deciding between two or more possibilities” (m-w.com);
however, this is a limited concept when determining reinforcement value. Choice can be
conceptualized as a one-time measurement, whereas preference is a repeated measure. For
instance, the field of behavior analysis often employs a variety of preference assessment
methods, which are conducted to determine a hierarchy of items/activities an individual
prefers (DeLeon & Iwata, 1996; Fisher, Piazza, Bowman, Hagopian, Owens, & Slevin, 1992;
Pace, Ivancic, Edwards, Iwata, & Page, 1985; Piazza, Fisher, Hagopian, Bowman, & Toole,
1996). An alternative to traditional preference measures is the observing response, employed
in basic research to determine the reinforcing value of a stimulus. The observing response is
defined as a response that produces discriminative stimuli involved with the reinforcement
schedule(s), but is still distinct from the response that directly produces reinforcement
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(Wyckoff, 1952). It is hypothesized that the discriminative stimuli acquire conditioned
reinforcement properties, which can be used to sustain responding (Witts, Ghezzi, & Manson,
2014); however, this concept has generally yet to be applied to other fields of study.
Even though differences in PFT and PFP productivity have been documented and
replicated, other variables might be responsible for the observed changes (i.e., work task,
research setting, participant/employee motivation). Considering that labor costs can account
for up to 80% of an organization’s total operating cost, the ability to manage and maintain
performance over time may determine an organization’s success or failure (Blinder, 2011).
The main purpose of the current review is to examine the effect PFT/PFP systems have on
dependent measures, such as productivity, preference, and on-task behavior. The secondary
purpose is to examine other variables commonly associated with PFT/PFP research, such as
settings factors. Third, I will introduce and review the observing response compared to other
common preference/choice measures. Finally, the review will conclude with a comparison of
results generated by the reviewed studies and will provide suggestions concerning the future
direction(s) of PFT/PFP research.
Overview of PFT and PFP Research
Twenty-one articles were examined for the purpose of the current review. All 21
articles were obtained via one of three methods: (1) citation analysis, which consisted of
analyzing the reference section of articles already obtained, (2) searches via PubMed,
Ebscohost, and PsycInfo databases, and (3) table of content analyses of the Journal of
Organization Behavior Management. Keyword searches for the online database and Taylor
and Francis website included pay for performance, pay for time, monetary incentives,
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monetary incentive schedules, employee compensation, and natural setting employee
incentives. Table 1 provides an overview of the 21 articles selected for inclusion in the current
literature review.
Productivity
Of the articles selected for inclusion, all 21 included a measure of performance or
productivity as a dependent variable. The current section will address three articles that serve
as exemplars, and the reader can refer to Table 1 for further information regarding the
remaining articles. All of the current studies included both PFT and PFP conditions as
independent variables, with the majority employing a direct comparison between the two.
Overall, studies showed higher productivity associated with PFP compared to PFT conditions.
Frisch and Dickinson (1990) was one of the first studies to demonstrate differences in
productivity between PFP and PFT conditions. Frisch and Dickinson randomly assigned
participants to one of the five pay conditions (i.e., 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, or 100%), which
represented the percentage of the $4.00 base pay earned via incentives (i.e., 60% condition=
$2.50 base pay, $1.50 incentive pay). Researchers then measured the resulting mean number
of parts assembled by each incentive group. Results indicated that participants were more
productive in each of the four incentive conditions (M = 87.2) than in the 0% (PFT) condition
(M = 68.7); however, little difference in productivity was observed between higher and lower
incentive groups (M = 87.2, 84.5, 88.7, and 88.4 for the 10%, 30%, 60%, and 100% groups,
respectively). The results obtained by Frisch and Dickinson were significant because they
extended previous PFT/PFP research by demonstrating that higher percentages of incentive
pay were not necessarily correlated with increased productivity. That is, the initial increase in
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productivity observed between the hourly pay (0%) condition and the lowest available
incentive condition (e.g., 10%) constituted the largest increase in mean quality parts
assembled (18.5 parts; 27%), but no significant differences in productivity were observed
between lower (e.g., 10% and 30%) and higher percentage (e.g., 60% and 100%) incentive
pay conditions. This study has since been replicated numerous times (e.g., Matthews &
Dickinson, 2000; Oah & Lee, 2011; Sundby et al., 1996), with only Oah and Lee (2011)
reporting major differences in productivity between lower and higher incentive conditions;
however, the variables responsible for these different results have yet to be determined.
Other studies have demonstrated differences in productivity in the natural setting. For
example, George and Hopkins (1989) conducted a 16-week study across three restaurant
locations. The researchers examined three main dependent variables: (1) average employee
earnings per hour, (2) mean increase in sales from previous year, and (3) mean number of
customers served per labor hour. Baseline consisted of the restaurant’s employees working
under hourly (e.g., PFT) wage conditions, during which the average employee at each
restaurant earned $2.10, $2.08, and $2.17, respectively. Following the implementation of PFP
(7% of waitperson’s gross sales), the average employees’ earnings per hour rose to $2.72,
$2.50, and $2.70, respectively (increases of 30%, 20%, and 24%). Mean number of customers
served per hour (e.g., productivity) also increased under PFP conditions, from a baseline of
14.2, 11.9, and 12.9, to an average of 17.6, 14.1, and 16.2 customers served per hour. These
changes represented 24%, 18%, and 26% increases in productivity across each of the
respective restaurant locations. This study is important because it demonstrated that the
addition of PFP compensation could produce positive changes concerning employees’ wage
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and productivity in the workplace setting. Finally, George and Hopkins showed the PFP
system could also serve to benefit employers, evidenced by the increase in mean sales across
the restaurants when compared to the previous year.
More recently, Oah and Lee (2011) employed a simulated work task using three pay
conditions: 0% (e.g., hourly; PFT), 10% incentive (e.g., low piece rate pay; PFP), and 100%
incentive (e.g., high piece rate pay; PFP). The two primary dependent variables—number of
correctly completed work tasks and time spent engaging in off-task behaviors—revealed
differentiated measures of productivity across incentive conditions, with the largest incentive
condition (e.g., 100%) associated with the highest average number of correctly completed
work tasks (862.7) when compared with the lower incentive (M = 157.8) and hourly pay
condition (M = 78). The results obtained by Oah and Lee differed from Frisch and Dickinson
(1990) twenty years prior, which did not find differentiated measures of productivity across
higher and lower incentive conditions.
Preference
Fourteen of the 21 articles included in the current review contained a dependent
variable related to participant preference. This section will provide a more in-depth look at
two articles that included preference measures. The articles selected to demonstrate clear and
unclear preference results, respectively. Table 1 provides an overview of the remaining 12
articles.
Thurkow et al. (2000) implemented an incentive-based pay system at a telemarketing
company. The incentive systems (i.e., independent variables) included four conditions:
(1) Top caller, which was given to person(s) who exceed the hourly call goal by the largest
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margin, (2) individual monetary incentives (PFP), (3) group monetary incentives, which was
an equally distributed bonus across all employees when a goal was exceeded, and (4) hourly
pay (e.g., PFT). A subsequent survey found that 80.5% of participants’ preferred individual
monetary incentives to group monetary incentives (17.1%) and hourly pay conditions (2.4%).
These results demonstrated employee preference for PFP (relative to PFT) conditions in a
natural setting.
A second study, Long et al. (2012), examined preference across three participants after
implementing both PFT and PFP schedules during a check-processing task. In the choice
phase, two participants selected the PFP schedule (100% and 75% of the time, respectively),
while a third participant selected PFT across 60% of opportunities; however, baseline
performance may have been a potential confound for the experiment because it served as the
determinant for PFT pay schedules.
Pay during the PFT condition was determined by multiplying the participants’ baseline
number of checks completed by $0.02. In the PFP condition, participants were paid $0.02 for
each check correctly processed. Therefore, the use of baseline performance essentially served
to punish better performance during intervention by limiting the amount of money that could
be earned in the PFP phase relative to PFT. This may have resulted in decreased motivation
among quality baseline performers, which in turn, affected productivity results and participant
preference measures. However, for the two participants that performed average during
baseline, the study demonstrated participant preference between the two (e.g., PFP/PFT)
compensation systems.
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On-Task Behavior
Seven of the 21 articles examined on-task behavior as a secondary dependent variable.
Overall, results obtained by the studies showed participants’ time spent on-task was higher
during PFP, relative to PFT conditions. Nevertheless, results across studies have differed
concerning on-task behavior during varying percentages of incentive pay conditions. The two
articles detailed in this section demonstrate these differences.
Matthews and Dickinson (2000) implemented three incentive pay conditions: hourly
pay (e.g., PFT), 10% incentive pay (e.g., PFP), and 100% incentive pay (e.g., PFP). During
the 10% and 100% conditions, participants received 1¢ and 10¢, respectively, for each screen
correctly completed during a computerized quality inspection task; however, participants in
the 100% condition did not receive base pay (base pay= $6.30 for 10% condition). Results
indicated participants spent more time on-task under PFP conditions (M = 60 min 43 s and 61
min 49 s for 10% and 100% conditions, respectively) when compared with PFT (M = 52 min
24 s). Matthews and Dickinson concluded that time spent on-task between the no incentive
and incentive conditions was statistically significant and performance tended to improve as
time spent working on-task increased; however, there was no differentiation in on-task
behavior between the higher (e.g., 100%) and lower (e.g., 10%) PFP conditions.
A subsequent study conducted by Oah and Lee (2011) found differentiation between
time spent on-task between PFP and PFT conditions, similar to Matthews and Dickinson
(2000). Researchers showed the lowest rates of off-task behavior occurred under the highest
incentive condition (e.g., 100%), while the highest rates occurred under the hourly pay
condition (e.g., 0%). However, Oah and Lee observed differentiated time spent on-task
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between the 0%/10% conditions (M = 339 min and 320.3 min off-task, respectively) and the
100% condition (M = 156.4 min), whereas Matthews and Dickinson found undifferentiated
results between the lower (e.g., 10%) and higher PFP (e.g., 100%) conditions.
Potential Environmental Factors
Thirteen studies in the current review were conducted under analogue conditions and
eight were conducted in the natural setting. Table 2 provides a further overview of the studies
with regards to the experimental setting, work task, and other temporal factors. Similar to
general productivity findings, both analogue and natural setting experiments generated higher
productivity under PFP conditions. Previous systematic reviews of the relevant literature have
suggested analogue settings were associated with slightly better PFP performance (e.g.,
Latham & Huber, 1992); however, subsequent systematic reviews have indicated other
variables (e.g., reinforcement schedules arranged having little in common) may also affect
results obtained across settings (Dickinson & Poling, 1996). This section will provide a more
in-depth overview of studies conducted in either setting.
Analogue Setting
All 13 analogue setting studies yielded higher productivity under PFP compared to
PFT conditions. For example, Farr (1976) examined the use of individual incentives, group
incentives, and no incentives during a card-sorting task. During the individual incentives
condition, first and second session production under PFT (M = 216.43 and 281.84,
respectively) increased by 10.77% and 10.56%, respectively, when individual incentives were
added (M = 239.74 and 311.59).
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Another analogue study, conducted by Slowiak et al. (2011), examined participant
performance and feedback solicitation during a computerized work task. Slowiak and
colleagues found the mean number of checks correctly completed (e.g., productivity measure)
was higher under PFP (885.7) than PFT (632.4) conditions, which represented a 40.1%
increase in productivity. Researchers also found participants’ engaged in higher rates of ontask behavior under PFP conditions, but solicited supervisor feedback more frequently during
hourly pay (e.g., PFT).
Finally, Terborg and Miller (1978) had subjects engage in a light assembly/
construction task for either piece-rate or hourly pay. Results suggested participants were more
productive under piece-rate pay (e.g., PFP) than hourly pay (e.g., PFT) conditions, evidenced
by higher quantity of pieces assembled under PFP (M = 8.0) than PFT (M =7.2) conditions
(11.1% increase). However, a 6.6% decrease in quality was observed from PFP (M = 7.1) to
PFT (M = 7.6).
Natural Setting
Similar to the analogue studies reviewed, all eight natural setting studies found higher
productivity under PFP conditions. For instance, Gaetani, Hoxeng, and Austin (1985)
implemented performance-contingent pay with two machinists that worked at an auto
mechanics shop. During baseline (e.g., PFT), the mechanics completed an average of $77.10
and $98.23 in repairs each day. Following the implementation of the PFP condition, the
mechanics average amount earned for the shop each day increased (M = $238 and $269,
respectively), which represented 210% and 174% productivity increases over baseline
measures.
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A longitudinal study conducted by LaMere, Dickinson, Henry, Henry, and Poling
(1996) examined PFT and PFP conditions across 20 truck drivers, using mean number of job
points earned per hour as the primary dependent measure. Job points were assigned to various
tasks based upon time required to complete the task (e.g., round trip, dumping materials, etc.)
and quality of task completion. Points could then be redeemed for tangibles, such as money or
paid time off. The truck drivers were split into two groups, which only differed in the length
of time they spent in each condition. Baseline (e.g., PFT) yielded an average of .46 (Group 1)
and .55 (Group 2) job points earned per hour. Once PFP was initiated, these productivity
measures increased 13% for Group 1 (M = .52) and 9.1% for Group 2 (M = .60). Yet
subsequent incentive value increases did not produce any further significant differences in the
truck drivers’ productivity.
Finally, Luthans, Paul, and Taylor (1985) conducted a study at a department store.
Participants consisted of department store employees and their behavior was scored as either
“functional” or “dysfunctional” based upon behavioral descriptions of performance. For
instance, ringing up a customer was considered functional, while idly standing or conversing
with other employees was deemed dysfunctional. During baseline (e.g., PFT), the
experimental group engaged in an average of 49.6 functional performance behaviors, which
increased 10.7% during intervention (M = 54.9); however, post-intervention, a reversal to
baseline conditions (e.g., PFT) yielded a decrease in functional behaviors (M = 50.6; 7.8%
decrease). Overall, Luthans et al. (1985) showed a positive change in employee productivity
under PFP conditions, which decreased to near-baseline levels once withdrawn.
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Preference Measures
A variety of preference assessment procedures and methods have been developed to
evaluate preference, including paired-stimulus (Fisher et al., 1992), multiple-stimulus with
replacement (Windsor, Piche, & Locke, 1994), and multiple-stimulus without replacement
(DeLeon & Iwata, 1996). Within the field of organizational behavior management, employers
have been shown to be poor predictors of employee preference (Wilder, Harris, Casella,
Wine, & Postma, 2011); however, rank ordering and survey assessments have been shown to
be effective in identifying stimuli that later functioned as reinforcers (Wine, Reis, & Hantula,
2014). Nevertheless, preference assessments may be affected by external factors, such as
deprivation or satiation of a given stimulus. Therefore, these traditional choice and preference
measures may not be ideal for measuring the reinforcement value of a given reinforcement
schedule. In turn, the examination of additional choice measures is warranted.
Traditionally, basic research has measured choice through concurrent-chains
procedures, which included initial links (choice phase) and terminal links (outcome phase),
followed by primary reinforcement (Fantino, 2008). The prevailing thought was that the brief
presentation of a stimulus during the terminal link would acquire conditioned reinforcement
properties through repeated pairings with primary reinforcement (i.e., Pavlovian
conditioning), which, in turn, could be used to measure preference (Fantino, 2008); however,
early studies by Schuster (1969) and Squires (1972) found that pigeons preferred the outcome
without superimposed brief stimuli, contrary to the traditional repeated-pairings hypothesis of
conditioned reinforcement. As a result, subsequent research focused on parsing out variables
that may serve to affect choice in a concurrent-chains schedule (Fantino, 2008). Fantino
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(1969) examined temporal properties of choice and hypothesized that longer delays would
produce a reduction in schedule preference. As predicted, the results indicated that choice
decreased dramatically as the choice-phase duration increased (i.e., delay-reduction theory
[DRT]; Fantino, 1969). The conclusion was that the strength of a stimulus as a conditioned
reinforcer could only be assessed by taking into account the relevant temporal context
(Fantino, 2008). In other words, a stimulus can function as a powerful conditioned reinforcer
in one temporal context (when correlated with a reduction in time to reinforcement) and not
function as a conditioned reinforcer at all in another context, when correlated with an increase
in time to reinforcement (Fantino, 2008). As it relates to the current proposed study, a
stimulus associated with a longer delay to reinforcement (thinner reinforcement schedule) will
function less as a conditioned reinforcer. This section was key in setting the occasion for
understanding the next section, which extends the effect of rate of conditioned reinforcement
on choice.
An extension of the effect of rate of conditioned reinforcement on choice was the
development of the observing response. According to Wyckoff (1952), the observing
response is a response that produces discriminative stimuli correlated with the reinforcement
schedules, but distinct from the response that produces reinforcement. In essence, the
observing response alters mixed schedules of reinforcement (where no schedule-correlated
stimuli are available) to a multiple schedule in which such stimuli are available, even if only
briefly. The initial Wyckoff (1952) study converted a mixed-schedule into a multipleschedule, in which a fixed-interval (FI) 30 s extinction schedules was in place. When a pigeon
engaged in an observing response (depressed the pedal located on the floor), the previously
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white keylight was replaced with either a red or green discriminative stimulus, which signaled
reinforcement or extinction, respectively. When the pedal was not depressed, the white light
was present whether extinction or reinforcement was in effect; therefore, observing converted
the mixed-schedule into a multiple-schedule arrangement that contained discriminative
stimuli, while no longer observing simply reinstated the mixed-schedule stimulus (e.g., the
white light). Fantino (2008) emphasizes that it is critical to reiterate the point that pedal
pressing has no effect on the rate or distribution of reinforcement; observing has a
discriminative function only.
Wyckoff (1952) found that higher observing response rates were associated with the
multiple-schedule in comparison to the mixed-schedule. In other words, as color
discrimination was acquired, the proportion of time spent on the pedal increased; however,
when the discriminative stimuli were no longer associated with reinforcement, observing
responses decreased (Hirota, 1972). Similarly, when the discrimination was reversed (i.e.,
previous SD was now SΔ) observing decreased until the new discrimination was learned.
These findings indicated that stimuli paired with a higher likelihood of reinforcement were
more likely to be conditioned reinforcers, whereas stimuli paired with a lower likelihood of
reinforcement were unlikely to function as conditioned reinforcers. Fantino (2008) and
Fantino and Silberberg (2010) refer to this as only “good news” should maintain observing,
while “useless information” does not maintain responding. Given the findings that a stimulus
correlated with extinction will not function as a conditioned reinforcer or maintain
responding, subsequent research examined observing when two schedules associated with
positive reinforcement were in place.
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According to the DRT viewpoint, only the stimulus associated with the more positive
schedule of reinforcement should function as a conditioned reinforcer and maintain observing
(Fantino, 2008). Auge (1974) confirmed this hypothesis and found that the FI-1 min schedule
maintained observing when compared with a FI-5 min schedule. Therefore, only stimuli
correlated with an increase in reinforcement value or a reduction in time to reinforcement
function as conditioned reinforcers; however, as far as choice is concerned, would we choose
an outcome in which high rates of conditioned reinforcement are received?
Only stimuli correlated with a reduction in time to primary reinforcement or an
increase in reinforcement value are conditioned reinforcers (Fantino, 2008). Other research
has supported these conclusions. For instance, Shahan (2002) suggested the rate of observing
decreases as the rate or magnitude of the primary reinforcer decreases. Furthermore, research
has demonstrated observing rates are higher under rich versus lean schedule components
(Shahan & Podlesnik, 2005). As it pertains to the current study, it has been hypothesized that
observing responses are maintained by conditioned reinforcing properties of the reinforcing
stimulus (Fantino, 1977; Fantino, 2008; Shahan & Podlesnik, 2005); however, the majority of
research has been conducted with primary reinforcers (i.e., food). In the current study, stimuli
associated with a lower schedule of monetary reinforcement should produce lower rates of
observing compared to a more-dense schedule of monetary reinforcement, but the effects of
using an already conditioned reinforcer (e.g., money) are not yet known. Furthermore, I am
interested in how response-dependent and response-independent deliveries of conditioned
reinforcement alter observing response rates. Given that the majority of research on the
observing response has occurred under basic behavioral research conditions (i.e., animal labs,
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gambling) and the fact that there is currently no “gold standard” for measuring preference
within the OBM field, observing response methodology may yield novel results related to
preference and how it is measured.
Conclusion
Blinder (2011) asserted that the ability of a company to manage and maintain
employee performance over time is crucial to the success of any business. Furthermore, the
key to success for many companies, such as Lincoln Electric, is the motivation of employees
to succeed coupled with employers listening to their perspective (Handlin, 1992). Given the
importance of incentive systems in addressing employee productivity, while taking into
account employee preference of incentive systems, continued employee incentive research
within behavior analysis is warranted.
The main purpose of this review was to examine the effects of PFT/PFP systems on
three dependent measures. Regarding productivity, PFP yielded higher productivity results
across the overwhelming majority of studies. Similarly, PFP was correlated with greater
preference and on-task behavior. The secondary purpose of the current review was to examine
other variables commonly associated with PFT/PFP research, such as setting factors. Both
analogue and natural setting studies produced higher productivity under PFP conditions.
Furthermore, preference measures revealed PFP was preferred across 67% (n = 6) of analogue
studies and across 80% (n = 5) of natural setting experiments reviewed. Only two analogue
studies (e.g., Farr, 1976; Pritchard et al., 1980) indicated participants slightly preferred PFT.
Two other studies, one analogue (Pritchard, Leonard, Von Bergen, & Kirk, 1976) and one
natural setting (LaMere et al., 1996) found no significant differences in preference between
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PFT and PFP conditions. On-task behavior was quantitatively measured during seven
studies—all of which were analogue—making comparisons between settings difficult. Four of
these seven studies found significant differences, in which PFP was associated with greater
time spent on-task (Long et al., 2012; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000; Oah & Lee, 2011;
Pritchard et al., 1980).
Finally, the third purpose of the current review was to introduce the reader to often
employed preference measures, followed by an introduction to the observing response, which
is used to test reinforcement effects. Previous research concluded that choice was not
influenced by the rate of conditioned reinforcement (Shahan, Podlesnik, & Jimenez-Gomez,
2006); however, stimuli correlated with a reduction in time (or an increase in value) to
primary reinforcement—true conditioned reinforcers—do affect preference (Fantino, 2008).
Therefore, when presented with two schedules of reinforcement, the rate of observing will
likely increase under the richer schedule component (Shahan & Podlesnik, 2005), the
schedule associated with a higher magnitude of primary reinforcement (Shahan, 2002), and
the schedule correlated with a reduction in time until the primary reinforcement in received
(Fantino, 2008).
Conclusions drawn from previous incentive schedule literature reviews (Dickinson &
Poling, 1996; Latham & Huber, 1992) further highlight the importance of continued employee
incentive research. Additionally, Condly, Clark, and Stolovitch (2003) presented quantitative
evidence regarding the effectiveness of incentive schedules across work tasks, number of
employees, and length of the incentive intervention. Therefore, future research must continue
to parse out these variables across both analogue and natural settings to gain a more intimate
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understand of what contributes to the success of incentive schedules. Furthermore, future
research must address choice methodology.
Currently, participant forced-choice scenarios are used to determine the reinforcing
value of a given stimulus, yet this methodology assumes that the choices given function as
reinforcement for that individual. Future research should not only examine participant
preference across schedules of reinforcement, but the reinforcement value of these given
schedules and how they affect responding. An applied behavior analyst would not infer the
function a given behavior serves without comparing it to the “gold standard” (e.g., functional
analysis); similarly, we must not assume the reinforcement value of a given schedule based
upon participant choice. Further examination across different choice measures may reveal a
“gold standard” for these assessments.
Based upon a review of the literature, the purpose of the current study is to extend the
“gold standard” of determining reinforcing value (i.e., observing response methodology) to
the assessment of PFP and PFT schedules. Phase 1 will examine responding across four
schedules of monetary reinforcement during a check-processing task within a multipleschedule arrangement (i.e., discriminative stimuli present). Phase 2 will remain the same as
Phase 1 with one exception: an observing response (i.e., pressing spacebar) will be required to
access the discriminative stimulus associated with each of the respective reinforcement
schedules.
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General Methods
Participants and Setting
Undergraduate and graduate students, 18 years of age or older, were recruited from a
medium-sized Midwestern university to serve as participants. Participants were required to
attend one session, which lasted approximately 45 (pre-experiment) to 60 min (experiment).
Participants were required to sign an informed consent form approved by the university’s
Institutional Review Board. Both the pre-experiment and experiment were completed in the
same university-based research room, which was approximately 11 x 17 ft. The room
contained two desks: the first, located immediately to the right of the entrance, was 4 x 2 ft;
the second desk (5 x 2 ft) was located directly to the right of the first desk. Each desk housed
one desktop computer and one chair. A masters-level research assistant (RA) prepared the
room and set up the computer prior to the participant’s arrival, which determined the
computer that participant would use to complete the check-processing task. Directly across
the room from the entrance were approximately 10 chairs placed against the opposing wall.
The research room comprised the simulated office throughout this study.
Materials and Apparatus
After consenting, participants completed a demographics form (see Appendix). In
addition to demographic questions, the form also inquired about color-blindness as an
exclusionary item. Participants were provided all necessary materials to complete the
experimental task—computerized data entry mimicking check processor at a bank—which
included a computer containing the customized software program, computer mouse, desk, and
chair.

29
The computer software was pre-programmed to display checks of five different
background colors: white, blue, orange, purple, and yellow. Each check color was associated
with a particular schedule of monetary reinforcement, which remained the same across all
participants and throughout pre-experimental and experimental phases (Table 3). In addition
to controlling the color of the checks, the software presented simulated bank checks, which
contained values ranging from $10 to $999 (see Figure 2). Participants were only required to
enter the whole dollar amount of the value displayed. The software was programmed to record
three measures: (1) number of checks correctly processed, (2) amount earned (in dollars), and
(3) the number of times the participant engaged in the observing response. The software also
provided real-time feedback during the pre-experiment (Stability Phase only) and experiment
(Phase 1 only), in addition to providing participants with a feedback page following all preexperimental and experimental phases. Feedback included (a) number of checks correctly
processed and (b) money earned. Finally, in line with Long et al., 2012, participants were
allowed to access the Internet and their personal cellular phones throughout the experiment,
although they were neither persuaded nor dissuaded prior to participation. The checkprocessing task outlined above remained the same throughout pre-experimental and
experimental conditions.
Dependent Variables
Number of correctly processed checks. The number of checks correctly processed
was converted to rate per minute. To convert the number to a rate we divided the number of
correctly processed checks by 60 s in the experimental phase. The customized software
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automatically recorded the number of checks correctly (and incorrectly) processed throughout
the experiment, which served as a measure of participant productivity.
Time spent off task. Off-task was defined as failing to interact with the check
processing system for a duration exceeding 10 sec. That is, the participant was considered ontask if he or she took between 1 and 9 sec to enter a value for a given check; however, any
time exceeding 10 sec between two checks was scored “off-task.” For example, if an
individual took 14 sec to enter a check value, it was recorded as 4 sec off-task. Experimenters
mined the time-stamped data and noted any time over 10 sec between processed checks for
each participant across each experimental condition. These durations were then added
together across each participant in that experimental condition, resulting in the total time
spent off-task. This procedure to determine time-spent off-task remained the same across all
participants and the corresponding experimental conditions. Finally, to represent the data as
percentage of time spent off-task, experimenters divided time spent off-task by the total
duration of the session and multiplied the resulting number by 100.
Calibration Tests
Preliminary calibration tests were conducted to determine the validity and accuracy of
the computer program. The RA conducted the calibration assessments, varying the percentage
of correctly processed checks, the order in which checks were entered correctly or incorrectly,
and the duration between check entry. This process served to mimic a variable-time (VT)
schedule of entering checks and was implemented across the pre-experimental and
experimental programs.
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Pre-experimental. During calibration tests on the pre-experimental program, the RA
used a color-coded application to enter the response schedule he or she was going to
implement. The application informed the researcher which response should be completed at a
given time, in accordance with the response schedule entered. Once entered, the RA began the
pre-determined response schedule on the check entry system. The response schedule was
comprised of a chain of responses that was continuously repeated throughout all preexperimental phases. For example, a 75% schedule might include a correct response after 5
sec, a correct response after 10 sec, an incorrect response after 5 sec, and a correct response
after 10 sec, followed by repeating this process. If the RA made an error during calibration
testing, the error and time at which it occurred were noted and the response was deemed
“accurate” if it matched the response noted by the researcher. That is, if a response was
supposed to be $410, but was entered as “$401,” the RA noted the time and error. If the data
displayed the response at the corresponding time as “incorrect,” then the researcher
considered the response to be accurately displayed by the system. Finally, the RA examined
the data for accuracy in identifying the VT schedule of check entry and percentage of errors
for each pre-experimental phase. For the VT schedule of check entry, the RA went through
each line of data in the CSV file to ensure that the time stamp on the entered checks matched
the pre-determined check entry schedule; Figure 3 shows a sample CSV file. For the
percentage of errors, the RA used the same process to examine if the number of checks scored
as “correct” and “incorrect” matched the pre-determined check entry schedule.
Calibration tests on the pre-experimental program were completed across two check
entry schedules: 50% and 67% correct responding. The first calibration schedule employed
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50% correct responding; thus, 50% of all checks were processed correctly, 50% were
processed incorrectly. During testing, the RA waited 5 s before entering a correct response,
followed by a 10 s delay before entering an incorrect response, and repeating this process. The
second calibration schedule differed from the 50% correct schedule in two key ways. First,
the 67% correct schedule used a repeating pattern of three responses (versus two). The RA
began by waiting 10 s before entering an incorrect response, followed by a 5 s delay before
entering a correct response, which was followed by another 5 s delay before entering another
correct response. Second, and more discernibly, this schedule implemented a higher
percentage of correctly processed checks (67%; 33% incorrect), relative to the first. Both the
50% and 67% correct schedules yielded 100% accuracy in identifying the VT schedule of
entry and the percentage of errors across each pre-experimental phase.
Experimental. Calibration tests on the experimental program used the same
procedures as tests on the pre-experimental program outlined above (e.g., pre-determined
response schedule), with the inclusion of tests on the observing response in phase 2 of the
experiment. A GRA conducted the experimental calibration examination, which consisted of
four different calibration tests.
Calibration test 1. The first calibration test implemented a schedule of four correct (C)
responses, followed by one incorrect (I) response, which was then repeated throughout the
experimental phases. There were 5 s between each correct response. After four correct
responses, the RA waited 10 s before entering an incorrect response (i.e., 5s—C—10s—I).
During phase 2, the RA maintained the same sequence and engaged in the observing response
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(O) after the third correct response (i.e., C—C—C—O). This calibration test was used to
ensure the stability criteria were accurate.
Calibration test 2. The second calibration test implemented two schedules, which
were alternated every minute. During the first schedule (1 I, 5 C), the RA waited 5 s before
entering an incorrect response, which was followed by a 5 s delay until the first correct
response, another 5 s delay before the second correct response, and so forth, until the RA had
entered five consecutive correct responses. After the fifth correct response, the RA waited 5 s
before entering an incorrect response and repeating the schedule until the end of the 1-min
interval. No observing occurred during Phase 2 under the first schedule. The second schedule
(6 C, 2 I) began with a 9 s delay before the RA entered an incorrect response, followed a 7 s
delay and four correct responses (each with a 7 s delay between them). After the fourth
correct response there was a 9 s delay prior to an incorrect response, which was followed by a
7 s delay/correct response, ending with another 7 s delay and a correct response. The second
schedule was set to equal 60 s, thus this schedule was not repeated within a given 1-min
interval. During Phase 2, the RA engaged in three observing responses before and after each 9
s incorrect response. The purpose of this calibration test was to establish the accuracy of the
observing response during Phase 2.
Calibration test 3. The third calibration test involved four different schedules. In the
first schedule, the RA entered 11 consecutive correct responses, followed by one incorrect
response, with a 5 s delay between each response. The second schedule (5 C, 1 I) employed
five consecutive correct responses, followed by one incorrect response, with a 10 s delay
between each response. The third schedule (2 C, 1 I) implemented two consecutive correct
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responses, followed by an incorrect response, with a 20 s delay between responses. The fourth
schedule (1 C, 1 I) included one correct response, followed by a 30 s delay, and an incorrect
response, also followed by a 30 s delay.
Each of these four schedules equal 60 s and were alternated every 1-min interval
throughout each experimental phase. In Phase 2, the RA engaged in one observing response
after each incorrect response across all four schedules used in the current calibration test. The
purpose of this calibration test was to simulate a participant responding in a manner that
would not result in him or her contacting the stability criteria in place.
Calibration test 4. The fourth, and final calibration test implemented two schedules.
The first schedule (2 C, 1 I) began with a 20 s delay prior to an incorrect response, followed
two consecutive correct responses with a 20 s delay. This schedule was applied to the first 1min interval of each experimental phase. The second schedule (1 I, 4 C) began with a 10 s
delay prior to an incorrect response, which was followed by four consecutive correct
responses, with a 5 s delay between correct responses. Thus, the first schedule was
implemented during the first 1-min interval of each experimental condition, and then the
second schedule was applied to the four subsequent 1-min intervals. The purpose of this
calibration test was to ensure that stability criteria would be met if the participant required
more than the first four 1-min intervals to reach stable responding. Finally, during Phase 2 the
RA engaged in the observing response prior to the last correct response of each sequence.
The experimental calibration tests were conducted to assess the accuracy and validity
of the computer program on the following on the following factors: (a) VT schedule of check
entry; (b) percentage of errors; (c) stability criteria; and (d) variable schedule of observing.
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The VR schedule of check entry and percentage of errors consisted of the same procedures
described for the pre-experimental calibration tests; however, assessing the latter two
involved novel procedures.
To assess stability criteria, the RA went through the CSV data file and first verified
that the time stamp for experimental phase/schedule was accurate, followed by examining
whether or not stability was met to confirm it matched stability, according to the predetermined schedule. If, according to the time stamp, the phase change observed in the CSV
file matched the pre-determined schedule, then it was deemed accurate. To assess the
observing response accuracy, the RA examined the CVS data file line-by-line and verified
that observing was recorded when it was supposed to occur, according to the pre-determined
observing schedule.
Human error was treated the same as during pre-experimental calibration testing: if the
RA made an error during testing, the error and time at which it occurred were noted. If the
CSV data displayed the response at the corresponding time and if the response matched that
noted by the RA, then the response was considered accurate. During experimental calibration
testing, the RA only noted two errors, which were both accurately recorded by the system.
Thus, all four of the calibration tests yielded 100% accuracy in identifying the VT schedule of
check entry, the percentage of errors, stability criteria, and the schedule of observing across
each experimental phase.
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Pre-Experimental Methods
Baseline
The pre-experimental baseline phase consisted of participants completing the checkprocessing task for 15 min. All checks remained the same color (i.e., white). Participants did
not receive monetary rewards or simultaneous feedback in the corner of the screen during the
check-processing task; however, participants did receive feedback on the number of checks
correctly processed following baseline (Figure 4).
Stability Phase
The pre-experimental stability phase lasted 30 min and introduced the four schedules
of monetary rewards. Each monetary schedule was assigned one corresponding check color
(see Table 3. Monetary schedules were alternated in a quasi-random order, ensuring each
participant was exposed to each schedule for 7.5 min. The computer system was preprogrammed to present each monetary schedule once in a random order per Stability Phase.
Real-time feedback on the number of checks correctly processed and total money earned was
available in the upper right-hand portion of the screen throughout the stability phase (Figure
5). Feedback concerning the number of checks correctly processed automatically refreshed
when the participant entered a correct check. Feedback concerning money earned
automatically refreshed in two different ways, depending upon the monetary schedule
currently in place. For PFP schedules, feedback on the amount of money earned updated
when the participant entered a correct check; for PFT schedules, feedback refreshed after the
passage of a pre-determined period. After completing the stability phase, participants were
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presented an overall feedback page that displayed the final number of checks correctly
processed and total money earned. Figure 6 displays a sample feedback page.
Schedule A (EXT). Schedule A implemented an extinction (EXT) schedule, in which
participants worked in the presence of an orange-colored check. In EXT schedules, no
reinforcement is provided, regardless of participant responding. This schedule served as a
control.
Schedule B (FT 15s). Schedule B implemented a fixed-time (FT) 15s schedule, in
which participants worked in the presence of a green-colored check. In FT-schedules,
reinforcement is provided based on the passage of a predetermined period, non-contingent on
responding; therefore, participants received $0.02 for each 15-second interval, independent of
processing any checks.
Schedule C (FR 1). Schedule C implemented a fixed-ratio (FR) 1 schedule, in which
participants worked in the presence of a blue-colored check. In FR schedules, reinforcement is
contingent upon responding rather than the passage of time; therefore, the higher the
participant responds, the greater reinforcement received. Throughout Schedule C participants
received $0.02 for each check correctly processed.
Schedule D (FR 5). Schedule D was the same as Schedule C, with two exceptions:
(1) participants worked in the presence of a yellow-colored check during Schedule D; and
(2) participants received $0.02 following every fifth check correctly processed.
Pre-Experimental Results
Four undergraduate students participated in the pre-experiment. Table 4 provides a
demographic overview of the four pre-experimental participants—Morgan, Clay, Randall, and
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Casey. Overall, participants demonstrated high accuracy (i.e., above 99% accurate) in the
check-processing task during the pre-experiment.
The number of correctly and incorrectly processed checks is graphically depicted in
Figure 7 (Morgan and Clay) and Figure 8 (Randall and Casey), whereas numerical values for
correctly processed checks and money earned across pre-experimental phases is presented for
each participant in Table 5. Figure 9 depicts the number of checks correctly processed during
the Stability Phase for Morgan, Clay, Randall, and Casey. The pre-experimental results are in
line with previous research, regarding higher participant productivity under denser PFP
schedules (i.e., Schedule C), relative to less dense PFP or PFT schedules; however, previous
research also suggested that the less dense PFP schedule (Schedule D) would be associated
with higher response rates than either the PFT (Schedule B) or EXT (Schedule A) schedule,
which was not observed.
Stability Criteria
To determine the stability criteria, researchers examined the stability and
representativeness of the data. We examined each participant’s data from the preexperimental stability phase across four combinations of time intervals and deviation from the
mean: (1) three consecutive 1-min intervals (i.e., 3-min bins) at 8% deviation from the mean;
(2) three consecutive 1-min intervals at 10% deviation from the mean; (3) four consecutive
1-min (i.e., 4-min bins) intervals at 8% deviation from the mean; and (4) four consecutive
1-min intervals at 10% deviation from the mean. Clay’s responding in Schedule C, in which
the first four data points were 25, 26, 25, and 26 responses, will serve as an example.

39
Three-minute bins (8% deviation). First, experimenters graphed and visually
analyzed each participant’s data. Second, experimenters calculated the mean for the first three
data points (i.e., data points 1, 2, and 3) in each pre-experimental phase by adding these
values together (e.g., 25 + 26 + 26 = 76) and dividing the resulting number by 3 (i.e., 76 / 3 =
25.33). Third, experimenters multiplied the mean by 8% (25.33 x 0.08 = 2.03) and the
resulting number was both added to and subtracted from the mean, which yielded an upper
and lower boundary (27.36 and 23.30, respectively). If the largest and smallest numbers in the
3-min bins were within the respective upper and lower boundaries, then the data was deemed
stable. In the current example, Clay’s largest value (26) was under the upper boundary (27.36)
and the smallest value (25) was above the lower boundary (23.30). However, if one of the
three intervals contained a value outside the upper or lower boundaries, then the process
described above was applied to the next three data points (i.e., data points 2, 3, and 4). This
process continued until stability in the data was obtained. Once obtained, experiments
highlighted these three data points on the graph for subsequent visual analysis. Table 6
displays the number of participants that met criteria across the four stability approaches.
Three-minute bins (10% deviation). Experimenters followed the same procedures
described for the 3-min bins with an 8% deviation from the mean, but with a 10% deviation
from the mean. The 10% deviation allowed for greater variability in responding. Using Clay’s
data once again, the mean remained the same (M = 25.33) and was multiplied by 10%. This
resulted in a value of 2.53, which was both added to and subtracted from the mean to yield the
upper and lower boundaries: 27.86 and 22.80, respectively. Once again, Clay’s responding
fell within these boundaries and was determined to be stable.

40
Four-minute bins (8% deviation). Experimenters employed the same procedures
while examining the data with 4-min bins; however, we now examined four (versus three)
consecutive data points. For example, with Clay the first four data points (25, 26, 25, 26) were
added together and divided by four, resulting in a mean of 25.5. The mean was then
multiplied by 8%, with the resulting number (2.04) being both added to and subtracted from
the mean to generate the upper and lower boundaries (i.e., 27.54 and 23.46, respectively).
Once again, Clay’s highest and lowest data points (i.e., 26 and 25, respectively) were within
the upper and lower boundaries.
Four-minute bins (10% deviation). Experimenters followed the same procedures
described for the 4-min bins with an 8% deviation from the mean, but used a 10% deviation
from the mean. For Clay, the mean from the first four data points remained the same (M =
25.5), but was now multiplied by 10% (25.5 x 0.10 = 2.55). This number then was added to
and subtracted from the mean to produce the upper and lower boundaries (i.e., 28.05 and
22.95, respectively)—Clay’s data once again fell within this range and was determined to be
stable.
This process of determining stability was applied to each participant across each preexperimental phase, and was continued until stability was determined for each time interval
and variability measure. Once stability was graphed for all four time/variability combinations,
experimenters conducted a visual analysis to determine the data paths that were stable, as well
as the most representative of participant responding. Primary investigators independently
arrived at stability criteria and then conferred to determine the final experimental stability
criteria. Experimenters determined the final stability criteria to be four consecutive, 1-min
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intervals (i.e., 4-min bins) at 8% deviation from the mean, which was applied to baseline and
phase 1 in the experiment. Four-min bins with 8% deviation was selected because it required
participants to maintain stable responding for the longest length of time with only an 8%
variability from the mean, in addition to experimenters determining the data was most
representative of participant responding when depicted in 4-min bins with 8% deviation from
the mean.
Experimental Methods
Procedures and Design
This experiment examined four schedules of monetary reinforcement using a
counterbalanced, replicated ABC design. We controlled for order effects by having the
computer program randomly arrange the presentation order of the different schedules across
participants during Phases 1 and 2. All four reinforcement schedules were presented twice
during Phase 2, which served as further control for potential extraneous variables.
For the check-processing task, participants used the numeric keyboard to enter the
displayed value of the check located underneath the check. After the participant entered the
value, he or she pressed the ‘enter’ key to submit the current check. Submitting the check
automatically brought up the next check for the participant to process (regardless of accuracy
in entering the previous check). The check-processing task remained the same across all
phases of the experiment.
Baseline
The experimental baseline condition required participants to complete the checkprocessing task described above until stability criteria was met (4-min bins with 8% or less
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deviation from the mean). Once met, the program automatically took the participant to the
baseline feedback page, followed by instructions for the next experimental phase (Phase 1).
Baseline was discontinued after 16 min if the participant did not reach stability. Similar to the
pre-experimental baseline condition, participants did not receive a monetary reward, but did
receive feedback on their performance (i.e., number of checks correctly processed) following
completion of baseline.
Phase 1
Phase 1 served to analyze differences in responding across PFT and PFP conditions
via four monetary reward schedules. Real-time feedback during the experiment, as well as
following Phase 1, remained the same as in the pre-experimental Stability Phase. Phase 1
remained in effect for a maximum of 32 min—a maximum of 8 min per monetary schedule—
or until stability criteria was met for that particular schedule. All four monetary schedules
remained the same as in the pre-experimental Stability Phase (see Table 3).
Phase 2
The goal of Phase 1 was to establish stable participant responding for the four
monetary schedules, whereas Phase 2 attempted to determine under which schedule(s) they
observe more. Therefore, discriminations between the colors associated with each particular
schedule in Phase 1 are an important component of Phase 2. Participants were provided the
same feedback as in Phase 1 (i.e., checks correctly processed and money earned), following
the completion of Phase 2; however, unlike Phase 1, participants did not received real-time
feedback while completing Phase 2. Phase 2 lasted 16 min and each monetary schedule was
presented for two, 2-min bins—a total of 4 min per schedule.
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During Phase 2 sessions, the four schedules were implemented in an alternated, quasirandom fashion. That is, the order each schedule was presented was random and differed
across participants; however, each schedule was presented the same number of times.
Therefore, the participant did not know which schedule he or she was currently working
under. To gain access to this information the participant engaged in an observing response.
An observing response is a response that produces (discriminative) stimuli involved
with the reinforcement schedule, but differs from the response that produces reinforcement
(Wyckoff, 1952). In the current study, the conceptualization is: the observing response (i.e.,
pressing spacebar) produced a discriminative stimulus (i.e., check color) associated with the
current reinforcement schedule, but still differed from the response that directly produced
reinforcement (i.e., correctly processing check or passage of fixed-amount of time).
Participants were informed in the Phase 2 instructions that the checks would appear white, but
that they could press the spacebar on their keyboard to make the check color (associated with
current schedule) appear for 1 s.
Experimental Results
A total of nine undergraduate students participated in the experiment: four females
(Olivia, Lacy, Samantha, and Katie) and five males (Aaron, Roger, Stu, Nelson, and Reggie).
Participants varied in age, ranging from 21 to 30 years of age (Stu and Samantha/Katie,
respectively), which yielded an average of 25 years old per participant. Table 7 provides an
overview of experimental participant demographics.
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Baseline
Seven of the nine participants met stability criteria within the first 4-min bin in
baseline, whereas Samantha and Roger required 5 min. Participants also demonstrated high
accuracy on the check processing task throughout baseline (M = 98.65%). Reggie registered
the lowest accuracy in baseline (94.52%); however, four participants (Samantha, Aaron, Stu,
and Katie) displayed 100% accuracy.
In baseline, Olivia correctly processed 184 checks, whereas Lacy exhibited the lowest
responding of all participants in baseline (86 checks; Figure 10). Figure 11 shows responding
for Samantha and Aaron. Samantha correctly processed the highest number of checks during
baseline (189); Aaron correctly processed 138 checks. Roger and Stu correctly processed 176
and 129 checks, respectively (Figure 12). Nelson, Katie, and Reggie correctly processed 140,
132, and 138 checks, respectively (Figure 13). Finally, only three of the nine participants
exhibited off-task behavior during baseline: Samantha (2 s), Roger (16 s), and Reggie (10 s).
Phase 1
Overall, accuracy remained high (M = 98.55%) on the check-processing task
throughout the four monetary schedules in Phase 1. All nine participants met stability criteria
within the first 4-min bin of each monetary schedule, with the exception of Lacy in Schedule
A, who required 6 min to meet stability criteria. Table 8 numerically displays the number of
checks correctly processed and money earned for all participants in Phase 1.
Figure 10 displays the number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for Olivia
and Lacy. Olivia correctly processed 175, 185, 186, and 204 checks during Schedule A,
Schedule B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively. Olivia remained on-task throughout
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Phase 1. Lacy correctly processed 142, 107, 108, and 109 checks during Schedules A, B, C,
and D, respectively. Lacy was off-task for a total of 16 s during Schedule A.
Figure 11 displays the number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for
Samantha and Aaron. Samantha correctly processed 161, 162, 169, and 155 checks in
Schedule A, Schedule B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively. Samantha remained ontask throughout Phase 1. Aaron correctly processed 130, 131, 136, and 142 checks in
Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively, and remained on-task throughout Phase 1.
Figure 12 displays the number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for Roger
and Stu. Roger correctly processed 161, 161 157, and 162 checks in Schedule A, Schedule B,
Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively. Roger remained on-task throughout Phase 1. Stu
correctly processed 156, 164, 148, and 155 checks in Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively,
and remained on-task throughout Phase 1.
Figure 13 displays the number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for
Nelson, Katie, and Reggie. Nelson correctly processed 159, 164, 162, and 168 checks in
Schedule A, Schedule B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively. Nelson remained on-task
throughout Phase 1. Katie correctly processed 139, 139, 133, and 131 checks in Schedules A,
B, C, and D, respectively. Katie was off-task a total of 3 s (Schedule A) during Phase 1.
Reggie correctly processed 160 (Schedule A), 169 (Schedule B), 161 (Schedule C), and 166
(Schedule D) checks, and remained on-task throughout Phase 1.
Phase 2
Table 9 numerically displays the number of checks correctly processed and money
earned for all participants during Phase 2. Table 10 displays time-spent off-task across all
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participants during experimental phases. Figure 14 depicts participants’ Phase 2 responding
for number of checks correctly processed and number of times observing, while Figure 15
displays participants’ time spent off-task. Olivia correctly processed 194, 103, 119, and 118
checks during Schedule A, Schedule B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively (Figure
10). Olivia did not engage in the observing response during Phase 2; however, Olivia was offtask during Schedule B (110 s), Schedule C (83 s), and Schedule D (95 s). Lacy correctly
processed 106, 103, 101, and 105 checks in Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively (Figure
10). Additionally, Lacy observed during Schedule A (4 observing responses), Schedule B (2),
Schedule C (11), and Schedule D (2). Finally, Lacy remained on-task throughout Phase 2.
Samantha correctly processed 95, 173, 166, and 94 checks during Schedule A,
Schedule B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively (Figure 11). Samantha also engaged in
the observing response during Schedules B, C, and D (4, 6, and 1, respectively). Samantha
was scored as off-task during Schedules A (106 s) and D (120 s). Aaron correctly processed
140, 145, 137, and 103 checks during Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively (Figure 11).
Aaron engaged in the observing response during Schedule A (3), Schedule B (3), Schedule C
(9), and Schedule D (2). Aaron was deemed off-task during Schedule D only (60 s).
Roger correctly processed 85, 170, 180, and 93 checks during Schedule A, Schedule
B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively (Figure 12), but did not engage in the observing
response. Roger was off-task during Schedule A (110 s) and Schedule D (102 s). Stu correctly
processed 140, 150, 162, and 91 checks during Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively
(Figure 12). Stu engaged in the observing response during Schedule C only (1) and was offtask for 116 s during Schedule C.
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Nelson correctly processed 159, 161, 162, and 91 checks during Schedule A, Schedule
B, Schedule C, and Schedule D, respectively (Figure 13). Additionally, Nelson engaged in the
observing response on one occasion during Schedules A, B, and C. Nelson was off-task for 96
s (Schedule D). Katie correctly processed 136, 134, 139, and 136 checks during Schedules A,
B, C, and D, respectively (Figure 13). Katie did not engage in the observing response and
remained on-task throughout Phase 2. Finally, Reggie correctly processed 129, 144, 134, and
145 checks (Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively; Figure 13). Reggie engaged in the
highest number of observing responses, observing on 141, 146, 134, and 158 occasions across
Schedules A, B, C, and D, respectively. Reggie remained on-task during all Phase 2 monetary
schedules.
Discussion
Productivity
The pre-experimental Stability Phase was successful in determining stability criteria
for the experimental procedures; however, we obtained mixed results with respect to
productivity under PFP and PFT conditions. Two participants (Morgan and Randall) correctly
processed the greatest number of checks during Schedule C (116 and 295, respectively),
whereas Clay correctly processed the greatest number of checks (232) during Schedule D.
Casey correctly processed the greatest number of checks under extinction conditions (i.e.,
Schedule A; 356 checks), but exhibited the second highest levels of responding under
Schedule C conditions. In contrast, Schedule D was associated with the lowest number of
correctly processed checks for both Morgan and Casey. Overall, these results are in line with
the results Oah and Lee (2011) obtained. Oah and Lee found differences in productivity
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between low and high (10% and 100%, respectively) incentive pay groups, which are similar
to the differences in productivity observed between PFP schedules (i.e., Schedules C and D)
in the pre-experimental Stability Phase by Clay, Morgan, and Casey; however the differences
across schedules concerning productivity in the current study were small in nature and tended
to be variable across participants.
Second, and more importantly, the main goal of the pre-experimental Stability Phase
was to determine a stability criterion that was representative of participant responding.
Through the implementation of four stability approaches (see Table 6), we were able to
effectively determine the stability criteria implemented during experimental conditions. The
inclusion of stability criteria ensured that participant responding during baseline did not
influence responding during Phases 1 and 2. That is, PFT pay was not affected by a
participant’s responding during baseline and participants were required to establish stable
responding before advancing to the next experimental phase. This was one of the major
limitations noted in Long et al. (2012): PFT payment was based on participant’s baseline
responding. Additionally, Long et al. did not require stable responding during baseline prior
to entering the next experimental phase. Both of these issues were addressed and resolved in
the current experiment, with all experimental participants meeting stability criteria during
baseline and Phase 1.
During experimental Phase 1, Lacy and Katie correctly processed the most checks
during Schedule A (142 and 161 checks, respectively). Stu, Katie, and Reggie correctly
processed the most checks under Schedule B conditions (164, 161, and 169 checks,
respectively). Comparatively, only Samantha (169 checks) correctly processed the highest
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number of checks during Schedule C, whereas Olivia, Aaron, Roger, and Nelson processed
the most checks in Schedule D (204, 142, 162, and 168 checks, respectively). Thus, in
Phase 1, participants were most productive under PFP conditions, although these differences
were only minor and ultimately deemed insignificant. Similar results were obtained during
Phase 2, with four participants (Roger, Stu, Nelson, Katie) correctly processing the greatest
number of checks during Schedule C, one (Reggie) during Schedule D, two (Samantha and
Aaron) during Schedule B, and two (Olivia and Lacy) during Schedule A. These results
indicate minor differences in productivity under PFP, relative to PFT conditions, but suggest
that there is no notable difference in productivity across monetary schedules. The results we
obtained are in line with those of Frisch and Dickinson (1990). Frisch and Dickinson
examined participant productivity across five PFP conditions (i.e., 0%, 10%, 30%, 60%, or
100%) and found no significant differences in performance across these five conditions;
however, the researchers did not a significant difference in productivity between each of the
five PFP conditions and the PFT condition.
Observing Response
While Phase 1 attempted to analyze differences in responding, in addition to
establishing stable participant responding, Phase 2 examined differences in participant
observing. During Phase 2, three of the nine participants (Olivia, Roger, and Katie) did not
engage in the observing response. Of the six participants that did engage in the observing
response, three (Lacy, Samantha, and Aaron) observed the most during Schedule C, while a
fourth (Reggie) observed the most during Schedule B. The final two participants that
observed—Nelson and Stu—did not demonstrate a discernable pattern of observing. Nelson
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observed on three occasions, but all three observations occurred under a different schedule
(i.e., Schedules A, B, and C). Similarly, Stu observed only once during Schedule C. Given
that the observing response is a test of reinforcement value, it was predicted that we would see
a greater number of observing responses during Schedules C and D. Although the majority of
participants engaged in the observing response during Schedule C, only Lacy, Samantha, and
Aaron showed any sort of discrimination towards observing under Schedule C, while Nelson
and Stu’s observing appeared random, at best. Thus, although the majority of participants that
engaged in the observing response tended to do so during Schedule C, we are cautious with
our interpretation of these results for several reasons.
First, the schedules may not have been salient enough to produce consistent observing.
That is, the checks colors associated with the different monetary schedules may not have been
noticeable enough to participants. As indicated in the experimental methods, participant
discrimination between checks colors in Phase 1 was an integral component of Phase 2;
therefore, if participants were unable to discern these differences in Phase 1, they may have
been less likely to observe during Phase 1. Similarly, the real-time feedback (Figure 5) may
not have been salient enough for participants to reliably attend to during Phase 1, which
would have hindered their ability to discriminate between the monetary schedules and would
have reduced their motivation to observe during Phase 2.
Second, it is possible the schedules themselves were not reinforcing enough to evoke
participant observing. Simply put, the differences between the four schedules, with respect to
money earned, may not have been enough to motivate participants to observe which schedule
they were currently working under. For instance, the fact that responding persisted under
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extinction and FT conditions may mean there is a parsimonious explanation: participants
simply did what they were asked to do—process checks. Thus, increasing the monetary
differences between the schedules might be one experimental change that would lead to
greater participant observing.
Off-Task Behavior
Off-task behavior was the final dependent variable we examined. Previous research
has demonstrated variable results, with respect to off-task behavior under PFP and PFT
conditions (e.g., Long et al., 2012; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000; Oah & Lee, 2011). Under
experimental baseline conditions, six participants were on-task 100% of the time, compared to
Samantha, Roger, and Reggie, who were on-task 99.33%, 99.67%, and 95.83% of the time.
These results are in-line with the of Long et al. (2012) across the first six sessions of baseline;
however, given the short baseline session duration due to the stability criteria in place,
participants may not have completed the check-processing task enough to reduce
attentiveness.
During Phase 1, all participants’ demonstrated 100% on-task behavior during the
monetary schedules B, C, and D. Lacy and Katie were the only participants deemed “off-task”
during Phase 1 (16 and 3 s, respectively), all of which occurred under Schedule A;
nevertheless, Lacy and Katie remained primarily on-task during Schedule A. Phase 2
generated more variable results, pertaining off-task behavior. During Phase 2, only Lacy,
Katie, and Reggie remained 100% on-task. Comparatively, during Schedule A, Roger and
Samantha were off-task 110 s and 106 s, respectively. Olivia was off-task 110 s during
Schedule B, and 83 s, along with Stu (116 s) during Schedule C. Five participants (Olivia,
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Samantha, Aaron, Roger, and Nelson) were off-task during Schedule D 95 s, 120 s, 60 s, 102
s, and 96 s, respectively. Thus, results in Phase 1 showed that the three participants spent a
little bit more time off-task during Schedule A than the other three monetary schedules;
however, these differences in time spent off-task were not significant enough to draw any
major conclusions.
Overall, the results observed during Phase 1 parallel those obtained by previous
research (e.g., Long et al., 2012; Matthews & Dickinson, 2000; Oah & Lee, 2011), which
demonstrated higher rates of off-task behavior during PFT versus PFP conditions, but the
differences in off-task behavior obtained in the current results are not significant enough to
warrant the same conclusions as previous research. The results obtained during Phase 2
paralleled those of Oah and Lee (2011), which found differentiated off-task behavior between
PFP conditions. That is, the denser PFP monetary schedule was associated with less off-task
behavior than the less dense PFP schedule; however, Phase 2 results were perpendicular to
those generated by Long et al. (2012) and Matthews and Dickinson (2000), which found
greater off-task behavior during PFT schedules and no differentiation between PFP schedules,
respectively. Matthews and Dickinson found that participants spent more time off-task under
PFT conditions, but spent approximately the same amount of time off-task under dense and
less-dense PFP conditions. Results from Phase 2 in the current study yielded quite different
results, indicating that participants spent more time off-task under the leaner PFP schedule
relative to the more-dense (i.e., FR 1) PFP schedule, which suggests differences between
these two schedules. Still, the results obtained for Phases 1 and 2 could be attributed to
several factors.
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First, the duration of the experiment and number of sessions may have affected results.
For instance, Long et al. (2012) used 15 min sessions, with participants completing between
33 and 63 sessions. Thus, participants likely were able to readily differentiate between the
monetary schedules in place, as well as tire of the experimental check-processing task, which
likely yielded more accurate results concerning time off-task.
Second, the current experiment employed the same off-task criteria as Long et al.
(2012), which was considering the participant “off-task” following 10 s of no-activity. After
stability criteria were implemented, no participant spent more than 6 min (360 s) under a
particular schedule. Similarly, the relative short overall duration (i.e., between 36 and 38 min)
of the experiment did not lend itself to participants growing tired of the check-processing task,
relative to if the task was completed for 15 min, 2-3 times per week across 33-63 sessions
(i.e., between 495 and 945 min).
A third and final factor that may have contributed to the results we obtained was the
Phase 2 itself. Given that Phase 2 aesthetically reverted back to baseline conditions, in that no
real-time feedback was provided concerning money earned or checks correctly processed,
participants may not have been aware they were receiving money; however, this is only one
theory that may explain responding. Given that the majority of off-task behavior was
observed near the end of Phase 2, a program failure cannot be ruled out. Despite the fact no
system issues were observed, that no participant reported any issues with the system, and that
calibration tests yielded 100% accuracy, this issue cannot be definitively ruled out. Thus,
future renditions of this (or similar) studies should employ a system-mandated time-stamp on
a consistent schedule, such as every 5 s, that is in effect regardless of participant responding.
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In the current study, our computer system employed a time stamp each time the participant
processed a check or engaged in the observing response; however, if the participant did not
respond, there was no time stamp to tell how far he or she got in the experiment.
Limitations and Future Research
The current study contained several limitations that warrant additional discussion.
First, experimental instructions may have been too long or too tedious for participants to read
completely or could have simply been unclear to them. Long et al. (2012) had the
experimenter read the instructions prior to each phase; however, in the current author’s
opinion, reading the instructions does not guarantee this issue would be resolved. One way
this issue could be eliminated is by requiring participants to answer 2-4 questions on the
instructions prior to advancing to the next experimental phase.
Second, the difference between monetary schedules, with respect to the magnitude of
earnings may have not been enough to increase motivation to discriminate between schedules.
Specifically, participants generally earned less than $10 for participation. Discrimination
between schedules could be enhanced by reducing the number of monetary schedules (e.g.,
from 4 to 2 schedules), increasing the magnitude of earnings between schedules (e.g., FR 1
earns $0.05 per response; FT 30 s earns $0.02), or simply telling the participants about PFP
vs. PFT before the schedule to enhance their ability to discriminate. Additionally, having
participants complete the check-processing task over a greater period of time would also
effectively change the magnitude of earnings, which would likely change the participants’
vantage point (i.e., molar vs. molecular) and lead to an increased ability to discriminate
between schedules. In Long et al. (2012), two of the three participants completed the check-
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processing task for 21 and 51 sessions, respectively, before clear and consistent differences in
responding appeared.
Finally, participants simply “doing what they were asked” (i.e., process checks) may
have served as a major limitation. Although the magnitude of earnings across the monetary
schedules may have played a role, we, as researchers, must consider the role of the
experimental instructions in relation to the task. That is, if there is no added value in proper
performance, then we might mistake “results” for the participant simply doing as he or she
was told (i.e., completing the task). To this end, we need to be cautious in interpreting
analogue results, in addition to being aware of the (potential) role rule-governed behavior
plays in participant completion of analogue tasks. Future PFP and PFT research must further
explore this concept of rule-governed versus contingency-governed behavior and its role in
analogue research.
Conclusion
One or all of these factors may have hindered participants’ ability to effectively
discriminate between the monetary schedules in place, which, in turn, may have affected their
motivation to engage in the observing response during Phase 2. In light of the limitations
discussed above, the current study provided promising results in several ways. First, the study
partially replicated previous incentive research regarding greater productivity under PFP
conditions, although the differences in productivity observed were variable across participants
and tended to be minor differences. This conclusion is supported by the fact that high rates of
check processing continued to occur during the extinction condition. Second, 67% of
participants that engaged in the observing response, observed the most during Schedule C

56
(i.e., FR 1; the most-dense PFP schedule). Given that the observing response is a measure of
reinforcement value, this finding provides preliminary evidence for the observing response as
a useful method for determining participant preference compared to more traditional
preference measures. Nevertheless, the results must be interpreted cautiously and additional
research is needed to draw more definitive conclusions. Finally, Phase 2 yielded higher rates
of off-task behavior during Schedule D relative to Schedule C, suggesting that the relative
density of PFP schedules may affect participant off-task behavior, although additional
research is needed to confirm this conclusion.
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Table 1
Overview of Studies Included in Literature Review
	
  

	
  
	
  
	
  

Study

Participants
(number)

Dependent
Variable(s)
Assessed
1) Productivity
2) Preference

Independent Variable(s)
Assessed

Farr
(1976)

144

Frisch &
Dickinson
(1990)

75

1) Productivity

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., 10%, 30%, 60%,
and 100%; PFP)

Gaetani et
al. (1985)

2

1) Productivity

George &
Hopkins
(1989)

29

1) Productivity

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)
2) No incentives (PFT)
3) Individual incentives
(PFP)

The addition of monetary incentives to
the two machinists increased their
productivity.
PFP increased mean number of
customers served and total sales
compared to the previous year across
three restaurant locations.

LaMere et
al. (1996)

20

1) Productivity
2) Preference

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Long et
al. (2012)

3

1) Productivity
2) Preference
3) On-task
behavior

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Addition of PFP program increased
performance; however, performance did
not increase further with subsequent
incentive value increases.
Majority of subjects preferred PFP to
PFT conditions. Higher rates of on-task
behavior and productivity were also
observed under PFP.

Luthans et
al. (1985)

33

1) Productivity

2) No incentives (PFT)
3) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Matthews
&
Dickinson
(2000)

106

1) Productivity
2) On-task
behavior

1) No incentives (0%;
PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g.,10%, and 100%;
PFP)

McGee et
al. (2006)

11

1) Productivity
2) Preference
3) On-task
behavior

1) Hourly pay with
individual feedback
(e.g., PFT)
2) Individual incentives
with individual
feedback (e.g., PFP)

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Results
Concluded PFP schedules improve
productivity when compared with PFT;
however, little difference was observed
concerning preference.
No difference in productivity between
subjects in higher PFP groups, but there
was a difference between PFT and PFP.

Experimenters found the addition of
monetary incentives (e.g., PFP)
increased functional behaviors (e.g.,
productivity)
Found time spent on-task between PFT
and PFP conditions was statistically
significant. Performance tended to
increase as time on-task increased.
Participants indicated they preferred
PFP to PFT conditions. Productivity
was also observed to be higher under
PFP conditions.
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Nebeker
&
Neuberger
(1985)
Oah and
Dickinson
(1992)

22

1) Productivity
2) Preference

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)

40

1) Productivity

2) No incentives (PFT)
3) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Oah &
Lee
(2011)

4

1) Productivity
2) On-task
behavior

Orphen
(1982)

63

1) Productivity
2) Preference

1) No incentives (e.g.,
0%; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., 10% and
100%; PFP)
1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., high-and-low
incentive groups;
PFP)

Petty,
Singleton,
& Connell
(1992)

1,205

1) Productivity
2) Preference

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)

Pritchard
et al.
(1976)

16

1) Productivity
2) Preference

Pritchard
et al.
(1980)

60

1) Productivity
2) Preference
3) On-task
behavior

Slowiak et
al. (2011)

60

Sundby et
al. (1996)

10

1) Productivity
2) Preference
3) On-task
behavior
1) Productivity
2) Preference

Terborg &
Miller
(1978)

60

1) Productivity
2) Preference

Thurkow
et al.
(2000)

6

1) Productivity
2) Preference
3) On-task
behavior

1) No incentives (e.g.,
hourly; PFT)
1) Individual incentives
(e.g., FR, VR, and
VR-VA schedules;
PFP)
2) No incentives (e.g.,
hourly; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., FR,VR, and
VR-VA
reinforcement
schedules; PFP)
1) No incentives (e.g.,
hourly; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(PFP)
1) No incentives (e.g.,
0%; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., 25%, 50%,
75%, or 100%; PFP)
1) No incentives (e.g.,
hourly; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., piece-rate pay;
PFP)
1) No incentives (e.g.,
baseline; PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., PFP)

Majority of participants polled indicated
they wanted to continue PFP. Addition of
PFP demonstrated increased productivity
through several measures.
Mean number of checks correctly
completed (e.g., productivity) was
consistently higher for the exponential
versus linear group.
Found differentiated results regarding
productivity between both PFP
conditions (10% and 100%) PFT
condition (0%). Time spent on-task was
highest under the 100% condition.
Better performance PFP conditions,
especially high-incentives, which also
rated job satisfaction higher.
Insignificant and inconsistent results
between conditions concerning
satisfaction (e.g., preference).
Majority of participants indicated they
would like to continue working under
PFP schedule. PFP also increased
productivity across multiple measures
when compared to baseline (e.g., PFT)
conditions.
Higher performance observed across all
three PFP conditions when compared to
the hourly (e.g., PFT) condition.
Satisfaction differed little between all
conditions.
Most time spent on-task occurred under
FR schedules, but performance was
similar under FR and VR-VA (variableratio-variable-amount) schedules.

Higher mean number of checks correctly
completed and time spent on-task
associated with PFP condition.
When presented with a choice scenario,
subjects most-often chose 25%, 50%, or
75% incentive pay conditions.
Higher quantity (e.g., productivity)
observed under PFP; however, higher
quality observed under PFT. PFP also
rated by subjects and supervisors as more
effortful.
Mean calls completed per hour (e.g.,
productivity) were highest during PFP
condition for 4 of 6 participants. 33 of 41
participants also indicated they
preference working for individual
incentives.
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Yukl et al.
(1976)

15

1) Productivity
2) Preference

1) No incentives (PFT)
2) Individual incentives
(e.g., 3
reinforcement
schedules [25¢CRF,
25¢VR2, 50¢VR2];
PFP)

Performance measures higher for PFP
than PFT—largest gain scores observed
under 50¢VR2 schedule, which was also
associated with the lowest satisfaction
(e.g., preference) scores.

60
Table 2
Overview of Studies Concerning Potential Setting Factors
	
  
Study

Research Setting

Farr (1976)
Frisch & Dickinson
(1990)
Gaetani et al.
(1985)
George & Hopkins
(1989)
LaMere et al.
(1996)
Long et al. (2012)

Analogue
Analogue

Luthans et al.
(1985)
Matthews &
Dickinson (2000)
McGee et al.
(2006)
Nebeker &
Neuberger (1985)
Oah & Dickinson
(1992)
Oah & Lee (2011)

Natural

Session Duration/Length of
Study
20 min. sessions/2 sessions
45 min. sessions/15 sessions

Work Task
Sorting cards
Assembling parts

Natural

N/A; 90 work days (18
weeks)
N/A; 16 weeks

Waitpersons (restaurants)

Natural

N/A; 78 weeks

Truck driving

Analogue
Natural

15 min. sessions/33-63
sessions
N/A; 6 weeks

Data-entry task (check
processing)
Retail sales (department store)

Analogue

70 min. sessions/1 session

Quality inspection task

Analogue
Natural

45 min. sessions/Up to 39
sessions
N/A; 91 weeks

Analogue

45 min. sessions/15 sessions

Analogue

Computerized simulation
(bank proof operator)
Small-purchase buyers/Supply
clerks (Naval shipyard)
Computerized simulation
(bank proof operator)
Computerized work task

Orphen (1982)

Natural

6 hr. (360 min.) sessions/30
sessions (over 6 weeks)
N/A; 1 week

Petty et al. (1992)

Natural

N/A; 1 year (52 weeks)

Pritchard et al.
(1976)
Pritchard et al.
(1980)

Analogue

5 hr. (300 min.) sessions/4
weeks
5 hr. (300 min.) sessions/3
weeks

Slowiak et al.
(2011)
Sundby et al.
(1996)
Terburg & Miller
(1978)

Analogue

45 min. sessions/3 sessions

Analogue

2 hr. (120 min.) sessions/1
session
2 hr. (120 min.) sessions/1
session

Thurkow et al.
(2000)
Yukl et al. (1976)

Natural

4 hr. work days/46 work days

Analogue

1 hr. (60 min.) sessions/2
weeks

Analogue

Analogue

Machinists (auto shop)

Quality control tests (Large
auto factory)
Union, clerical, staff, and
managerial-relevant job tasks
(electrical utility company)
Tests on learned electrical
material
Self-paced program texts
related to basic electricity and
electronics
Data-entry task (bank proof
operator)
Computerized simulation of
work performance
Light assembly construction
work tasks (using tinker toys
to create complex model with
moving parts)
Phone calling/sales
(telemarketing company)
Scoring answer cards used in
introductory psychology
course
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Table 3
Check Colors Associated with Pre-experimental and Experimental Monetary Schedules
Monetary Schedule

Check Color

Schedule A (EXT)

Orange

Schedule B (FT 15 s)

Green

Schedule C (FR 1)

Blue

Schedule D (FR 5)

Yellow
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Table 4
Demographic Overview of Pre-experimental Participants
Participant Age Gender Income
Morgan

23

F

$0- $10,000

Previous Experience
(years)
Yes (8 years)

Color-Blind

Clay

36

M

$41,000- $50,000

No

No

Randall

29

M

>$70,000

No

No

Casey

31

F

$0- $10,000

No

No

No

63

	
  
Table 5
Pre-experimental Participant Responding and Money Earned
Participants

Baseline

Stability Phase
Schedule A

Schedule B

Schedule C

Schedule D

Total

Correct
(#)

Correct
(#)

Money
Earned

Correct
(#)

Money
Earned

Correct
(#)

Money
Earned

Correct
(#)

Money
Earned

Correct
(#)

Money
Earned

Morgan

213

102

$0.00

105

$0.60

116

$2.32

94

$0.32

417

$3.24

Clay

412

212

$0.00

226

$0.60

203

$4.06

232

$0.92

873

$5.58

Randall

540

289

$0.00

273

$0.60

295

$5.90

292

$1.16

1149

$7.66

Casey

565

356

$0.00

332

$0.60

351

$7.02

324

$1.28

1363

$8.90

Total

1,730

959

$0.00

936

$2.40

965

$19.30

942

$3.68

3802

$25.38
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Table 6
Number of Pre-experimental Participants That Met Stability Criteria across the Four
Stability Approaches
Stability
Approaches
3-min bins

Baseline

Schedule A

Schedule B

Schedule C

Schedule D

4

4

3

4

4

Total (out of 20
opportunities)
19

4

4

3

4

4

19

3

3

3

3

3

15

4

4

3

3

3

17

(8%
deviation)
3-min bins
(10%
deviation)
4-min bins
(8%
deviation)
4-min bins
(10%
deviation)
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Table 7
Demographic Overview of Experimental Participants
Participant

Age

Gender

Income

Color-Blind

$11,000- $20,000

Previous Experience
(years)
No

Olivia

26

F

Lacy

23

F

$0- $10,000

No

No

Samantha

30

F

$11,000- $20,000

No

No

Aaron

22

M

$0- $10,000

No

No

Roger

25

M

$31,000- $40,000

No

No

Stu

21

M

$0- $10,000

No

No

Nelson

29

M

$11,000-$20,000

No

No

Katie

30

F

$0- $10,000

No

No

Reggie

23

M

$0- $10,000

No

No

No
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Table 8
Participant Responding and Money Earned During Experimental Baseline and Phase 1
Baseline
Participant

Schedule A

Schedule B

Phase 1
Schedule C

Schedule D

Correct
(#)

Correct
(#)

$
Earned

Correct
(#)

$
Earned

Correct
(#)

$
Earned

Correct
(#)

$
Earned

Olivia

184

175

$0.00

185

$0.32

186

$3.72

204

$0.82

Lacy

86

142

$0.00

107

$0.32

108

$2.16

115

$0.46

Samantha

189

161

$0.00

162

$0.32

169

$3.38

155

$0.66

Aaron

138

130

$0.00

131

$0.32

136

$2.72

142

$0.54

Roger

176

161

$0.00

161

$0.32

157

$3.14

162

$0.62

Stu

129

156

$0.00

164

$0.32

148

$2.96

155

$0.58

Nelson

140

159

$0.00

164

$0.32

162

$3.24

168

$0.64

Katie

132

139

$0.00

139

$0.32

133

$2.66

131

$0.52

Reggie

138

160

$0.00

169

$0.32

161

$3.44

166

$0.68

1,312

1,383

$0.00

1,382

$2.88

1,360

$27.42

1,398

$5.52

Total

Participant Responding, Observing, and Money Earned During Experimental Phase 2
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Table 10
Time Spent Off-Task in Experimental Baseline, Phase 1, and Phase 2
Experimental Time Off-Task (in sec)
Phase 1

Baseline
Participant

Phase 2

Schedule
A

Schedule
B

Schedule
C

Schedule
D

Schedule
A

Schedule
B

Schedule
C

Schedule
D

Olivia

0

0

0

0

0

0

110

83

95

Lacy

0

16

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Samantha

2

0

0

0

0

106

0

0

120

Aaron

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

60

Roger

16

0

0

0

0

110

0

0

102

Stu

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

116

0

Nelson

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

96

Katie

0

3

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Reggie

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

Total

18

19

0

0

0

216

110

199

473
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Figure 1. Typical observing response procedure, as developed in the original Wyckoff (1952)
study. In first condition (a, top of figure), the subject’s observing response changes mixedschedule into multiple-schedule arrangement. In second condition (b, bottom of figure), the
lights produced are not correlated with the schedules in effect; therefore, they have no
discriminative or informative value. It must also be stated that his figure was reproduced from
Fantino (2008) and not by the current author.
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Figure 2. Sample bank check displayed to participants throughout pre-experimental and
experimental conditions.
	
  
	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  

	
  
Figure 3. Sample CSV file used during calibration testing, pre-experiment, and experiment.
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Figure 4. Sample feedback screen displayed to participants following pre-experimental and
experimental baseline phase.
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Figure 5. Sample real-time feedback screen during pre-experimental Stability Phase and
experimental Phase 1, highlighted by the red box in the upper right-hand corner.
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Figure 6. Sample feedback phase displayed to participants following the pre-experimental
Stability Phase and experimental Phase 1. Feedback screen displays “number of checks
correctly processed” and “amount of money earned.”
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Pre-Experimental Check Processing
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Pre-Experimental Check Processing
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Figure 7. Number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for Morgan (top panel) and
Clay (bottom panel) across pre-experimental baseline and stability phases. The Stability Phase
includes the four monetary schedules: A (EXT), B (FT 15s), C (FR 1), and D (FR 5). The red
boxes denote when stability was met according to the experimental stability criteria (4-minute
bins with 8% or less deviation from the mean).
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Pre-Experimental Check Processing
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Figure 8. Number of checks correctly and incorrectly processed for Randall (top panel) and
Casey (bottom panel) across pre-experimental baseline and stability phases. The stability
phase includes the four monetary schedules: A (EXT), B (FT 15s), C (FR 1), and D (FR 5).
The red boxes denote when stability was met according to the experimental stability criteria
(4-minute bins with 8% or less deviation from the mean).
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Pre-Experimental Stability Phase Check Processing
400"
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Figure
9. Number of checks correctly processed for Morgan, Clay, Randall, and Casey across
!
theFigure
four monetary
schedules
in correctly
the pre-experimental
Phase.
9. Number
of checks
processed forStability
Morgan,
Clay, Randall, and Casey
across the four monetary schedules in the pre-experimental Stability Phase.
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Experimental Check Processing and Observing
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Figure 10. Number of checks correctly (closed squares) and incorrectly processed (closed
circles) for Olivia (top panel) and Lacy (bottom panel) during experimental baseline, Phase 1,
and Phase 2. Number of observing responses (open triangles) depicted in Phase 2 only.
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Experimental Check Processing and Observing
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Figure 11. Number of checks correctly (closed squares) and incorrectly processed (closed
circles) for Samantha (top panel) and Aaron (bottom panel) during experimental baseline,
Phase 1, and Phase 2. Number of observing responses (open triangles) depicted in Phase 2
only.
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Experimental Check Processing and Observing
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Figure 12. Number of checks correctly (closed squares) and incorrectly processed (closed
circles) for Roger (top panel) and Stu (bottom panel) during experimental baseline, Phase 1,
and Phase 2. Number of observing responses (open triangles) depicted in Phase 2 only.
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Experimental Check Processing and Observing
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Figure 13. Number of checks correctly (closed squares) and incorrectly processed (closed circles)
for Nelson (top panel), Katie (middle panel), and Reggie (bottom panel) during experimental
baseline, Phase 1, and Phase 2. Number of observing responses (open triangles) depicted in Phase
2 only.
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Experimental Check Processing and Observing (Phase 2)
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Figure 14. The bar graph (primary y-axis) denotes the number of checks correctly processed
by participants during experimental Phase 2. Line graph (secondary y-axis) denotes the
number of observing responses participants completed during experimental Phase 2.
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Experimental Time Spent Off-Task (Phase 1)
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Figure 15. Displays participants’ time spent off-task (in sec) during experimental Phase 1
(top-panel) and Phase 2 (bottom-panel).
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Appendix
Sample demographics form completed by participants.

Demographics Form
Please complete the following form to the best of your ability. If you are unsure how to answer a question,
the investigator(s) listed at the bottom of the page can provide assistance. Thank you!
1.

What is your current age? ______________

2.

Gender (check one):

3.

What is your current yearly income? (Excluding spouse, parents, etc.; check one):

4.

Male [ ]

$0- $10,000

[ ]

$11,000- $20, 000

[ ]

$21,000- $30,000

[ ]

$31,000- $40,000

[ ]

$41,000- $50,000

[ ]

$51,000- $60,000

[ ]

$61,000- $70,000

[ ]

Greater than $70,000

[ ]

Female [ ]

Other [ ]

Do you have previous work experience check processing at a bank?
Yes [ ] No [ ]
If yes, please indicate the duration of your experience? ____________________

5.

Are you color-blind?

Yes [ ]

No [ ]

Unsure [ ]

